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Abstract
Background: Thailand has achieved universal health coverage since 2002 through the implementation of the
Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) for 47 million of the population who were neither private sector employees nor
government employees. A well performing UCS should achieve health equity goals in terms of health service use
and distribution of government subsidy on health. With these goals in mind, this paper assesses the magnitude
and trend of government health budget benefiting the poor as compared to the rich UCS members.
Method: Benefit incidence analysis was conducted using the nationally representative household surveys, Health
and Welfare Surveys, between 2003 and 2009. UCS members are grouped into five different socio-economic status
using asset indexes and wealth quintiles.
Findings: The total government subsidy, net of direct household payment, for combined outpatient (OP) and
inpatient (IP) services to public hospitals and health facilities provided to UCS members, had increased from 30
billion Baht (US$ 1 billion) in 2003 to 40-46 billion Baht in 2004-2009. In 2003 for 23% and 12% of the UCS
members who belonged to the poorest and richest quintiles of the whole-country populations respectively, the
share of public subsidies for OP service was 28% and 7% for the poorest and the richest quintiles, whereby for IP
services the share was 27% and 6% for the poorest and richest quintiles respectively. This reflects a pro-poor
outcome of public subsidies to healthcare. The OP and IP public subsidies remained consistently pro-poor in
subsequent years.
The pro-poor benefit incidence is determined by higher utilization by the poorest than the richest quintiles,
especially at health centres and district hospitals. Thus the probability and the amount of household direct health
payment for public facilities by the poorest UCS members were less than their richest counterparts.
Conclusions: Higher utilization and better financial risk protection benefiting the poor UCS members are the
results of extensive geographical coverage of health service infrastructure especially at district level, adequate
finance and functioning primary healthcare, comprehensive benefit package and zero copayment at points of
services.
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Background
Thailand has achieved universal health coverage since
2002 through the implementation of the Universal Cov-
erage Scheme (UCS) for 47 million (75%) of the popula-
tion who were neither private sector employees covered
by the Social Health Insurance Scheme, nor government
employees and dependants covered by the Civil Servant
Medical Benefit Scheme [1].
Grouping 47 million UCS members of the whole-
country’s 65 million population by their households’
asset index quintiles (20 percent equally), the poorest
and poor quintiles accounted for almost half (46-47%)
of all UCS members (Figure 1) while less than 15% of
the UCS beneficiaries belonged to the richest quintile
between 2003 and 2009. The UCS covers most of the
poor Thai population who reside in the rural areas.
Policy concerns if the poor UCS members benefit from
the Scheme.
Increased utilization of services among UCS members
was observed; the total outpatient (OP) visits to district
and provincial hospitals increased from 111.9 million
visits in 2003 to 140.7 million in 2009 [2]. Total inpati-
ent (IP) admissions to the Ministry of Public Health
(MOPH) hospitals also increased from 4.30 million in
2003 to 5.21 million in 2009 [3].
A rigorous analysis of the impact of the UCS over the
period of 1996 to 2005 [covering the period prior to and
after achieving UC in 2002] revealed a reduction in prob-
ability of not seeking care when ill and not using health
care from the informal sector providers for outpatient
services by 1.3 and 2.3%, respectively [4]. The probability
of having a visit to district hospitals increased by 2.3%
and to provincial hospitals reduced by 4.1%. This is a
result of the policy to promote primary care as the first
contact when ill. For those who were hospitalized, the
probability of using district hospitals increased by 3.5%,
while the use at provincial hospitals reduced by 6.4%.
Prior studies on the whole-country and all-scheme
population revealed the OP and IP utilization concen-
trated more among the poor than the rich and the
Figure 1 National quintiles of household asset index of UCS beneficiaries as % of all members, 2003-2009
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government health subsidy was pro-poor [5,6]. A well per-
forming UCS should be able to achieve health equity goal.
With this goal in mind, this study assessed the magnitude
and trend of health budget distribution and whether it
benefited the rich or the poor UCS members at national
and sub-national levels, and discussed factors contributing
to the pro-poor subsidies.
Methods
Secondary data analyses used a benefit incidence analysis
(BIA) approach to assess the distribution of government
subsidies on health to different socio-economic groups
who were UCS members. BIA is defined as “a method of
computing the distribution of public expenditure across
different demographic groups, such as women and men”.
The procedure involves allocating per unit public subsi-
dies, for example, expenditure per student for the educa-
tion sector, according to individual utilization rates of
public services [7].
Data sources
A series of Health and Welfare Surveys (HWS) was used
from 2003, one year following the nationwide implemen-
tation of UCS to the most recent year in 2009, noting
that HWS was conducted every year for five years
between 2003 and 2007 and thereafter every two years in
2008 and beyond. The HWS is a structured household
interview survey on illnesses and health service utilization
of approximately 70 thousand individuals from nationally
representative households. The Survey used to be con-
ducted every five years before the UCS period by the
National Statistical Office (NSO). Unfortunately prior to
the advent of UCS in 2002, a number of key variables in
the HWS were missing, notably quantification of health
service utilization, health payments and economic status
of the interviewees and households.
A one-month recalling period for non-hospitalized and
one year for hospitalized illnesses were applied. Choices
for the ambulatory care for the last illness episode
include the whole range of providers not covered by UCS
such as self medication, herbal medicine and traditional
healers as well as health facilities covered by UC such as
health centres, district hospitals, provincial hospitals, uni-
versity hospitals, other government hospitals, private
clinics and hospitals. Choices of the hospitalization
include both public and private hospitals excluding
health centres and private clinics which do not provide
inpatient services. Out-of-pocket payments by household
members for each OP visit and IP admission were asked
in monetary terms.
Equity stratifier
To determine the economic gradient of UCS members,
this analysis used a presence (or an absence) of selected
assets in households. Wealth better reflects living stan-
dards than incomes since wealth reflects both inventory
and flows. A person living in the household constructed
with permanent materials and having toilets, motor vehi-
cles and electrical equipments such as televisions, tele-
phones, refrigerators and computers was considered richer
than those who do not own these assets. Through a princi-
pal component analysis [8] of all household samples, an
asset index was created for each household. All house-
holds in the country were then ranked by asset indices of
their households then divided into five subgroups equally
into five wealth quintiles, using the individual sampling
weights. Only the UCS beneficiaries with respect to the
national wealth quintiles of their households were selected
for this analysis.
Health service utilization
The health care utilization in the analysis was limited to
services covered by UCS, for which self medication at
pharmacies or drug stores, traditional medicines, and
traditional healers were not covered.
The number of OP visits was obtained from the utili-
zation of services among household members reporting
non-hospitalized illnesses with up to 8 possible episodes
in the last month prior to the interview. The annualized
(12-month) OP visits per facility type were then calcu-
lated. The number of hospital admissions per year for
each health facility was directly estimated from the
number of reported admissions in the last year.
Government health subsidy
Since public hospitals and facilities are the typical provi-
ders of UCS members where budget was allocated based
on capitation for OP services and case-based payment
under global budget for IP services, these public provi-
ders were included in the assessment of government
health subsidies.
The UCS-specific unit costs per OP visit and per IP
admission were obtained from National Health Security
Office (NHSO). It is noted that university hospitals had
the highest cost 1,600-1,900 Baht per OP visit and
18,000-27,000 Baht per admission compared with the
lower level facilities.
The unit cost that NHSO paid for an OP and IP ser-
vice, netted out as direct payment for that patient was
defined as the unit subsidy. If the amount of payment
was greater than the unit cost, the subsidy became
zero. The amount of government health subsidy was
calculated by multiplying the unit subsidy with the
number of OP visits or IP admissions at different types
of health facility by each individual UCS member. The
facility-specific subsidies for OP and IP services were
summed up and compared across different wealth
quintiles.
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Findings
Profiles of government health subsidies
National aggregate
The amount of government health subsidy, net of direct
household payment, to UCS beneficiaries was 30.15 bil-
lion Baht in 2003 at 2009 price (Table 1) or US$ 1 billion
(exchange rate, 30 Baht per dollar); it increased to 46.5
billion Baht in 2009, a 36.2% real term increase. It is
noted that subsidy for the OP was lower than IP services.
Subsidies by level of care, the majority of the UCS
budget subsidized OP services at district hospitals, fol-
lowed by provincial hospitals, especially in recent years.
The subsidy to health centers did not show a noticeable
increase due to a lower unit cost and a slower increasing
trend of utilization. Provincial hospitals had a major
share of the IP subsidy and the trend is increasing, due
to the higher unit cost than district hospitals and more
provision of tertiary care services with higher cost.
On average, the government subsidy for all-facility OP
visit and IP admission was 313 and 395 Baht per UCS
beneficiary respectively in 2003; this had increased to
417 and 530 Baht respectively in 2009.
Subsidies by wealth quintiles, subsidy for OP service
used by the poorest quintile UCS beneficiaries was 27-30%
compared to their respective share of members, 23-24% of
total UC population; while the richest quintiles reaped the
benefit of only 7-11% of the total subsidies, less than the
population share, 12-13% of total UC members (Figure 2).
The pro-poor pattern also emerged for IP subsidies;
27-30% of government health budget net of household
payment went to the poorest quintile, which is higher
than the size of the poorest quintile; while only 6-10%
went to the richest quintile in these years, lower than
the size of the richest quintile.
Subsidy by type of health facility
Figure 3 shows distribution of OP and IP subsidies across
wealth quintiles of the UCS beneficiaries with respect to
health facility types. A similar pattern emerged in 2003-
2009; data from 2004 were selected for illustration.
Clearly, the poorest quintiles benefit most of the OP and
IP subsidies while the richest quintiles benefit the least.
Even though health centers had a relatively a larger
share of the OP visits, especially for the lower quintiles,
their subsidy share was noticeably smaller than that of
district and provincial hospitals due to their much lower
OP unit costs. A similar explanation was applied in the
case of the IP subsidy when comparing between district
and provincial hospitals.
Table 1 Amount of government health subsidy by types of health service and facility, 2009 constant price
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009
1. Total subsidy, million Baht 34,147 42,300 46,838 44,812 47,505 46,502
1.1 Total OP subsidy 15,092 16,355 16,643 14,341 14,862 20,489
○ Health center 2,363 2,634 2,955 1,656 1,931 2,339
○ District hospital 7,269 7,439 7,847 7,227 6,422 8,523
○ Provincial hospital 3,395 3,994 4,432 4,430 4,642 7,674
○ University hospital 1,001 1,516 818 626 1,037 736
○ Other govt. hospital 1,063 773 589 401 829 1,217
1.2 Total IP subsidy 19,055 25,943 30,195 30,471 32,643 26,013
○ District hospital 7,840 9,117 10,081 10,432 9,969 7,322
○ Provincial hospital 8,115 13,054 15,049 16,364 19,521 16,749
○ University hospital 759 2,496 3,082 2,157 1,747 699
○ Other govt. hospital 2,340 1,276 1,984 1,518 1,405 1,242
2. Total subsidy, Baht per capita 708 884 1,016 945 998 947
2.1 OP subsidy per capita 313 342 361 302 312 417
○ Health center 49 55 64 35 41 48
○ District hospital 150 155 171 153 135 174
○ Provincial hospital 70 83 96 94 97 156
○ University hospital 21 32 18 13 21 15
○ Other govt. hospital 22 16 13 8 17 25
2.2 IP subsidy per capita 395 542 655 642 686 530
○ District hospital 162 191 219 220 210 149
○ Provincial hospital 169 273 326 344 410 341
○ University hospital 16 52 67 45 37 14
○ Other govt. hospital 49 27 43 32 30 25
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Benefit incidence by geographic region
The public subsidy for OP and IP services that benefited
disproportionately more the poor UCS beneficiaries at
the national scale held true even at the sub-national
level. Figure 4 reiterates this finding. It should be noted
that the poorest northeast region (left lower panel), has
the largest size of poorest (Q1) and poor (Q2) UCS
members compared to other regions. Consistently across
four regions, the richest quintiles located at the position
of having the lowest level of OP and IP subsidies,
whereas the poorest quintiles located at the position of
having the highest subsidy level, except for the south
region. This reflects homogeneity of the UCS program
implementation and outcome throughout the country.
Explaining the pro-poor health subsidies
Heath utilization
Variation in health subsidy by the government is driven
by utilization and net government subsidy; the net sub-
sidy is the difference between unit costs and out-of-
pocket payment by households. As there is no bias in
unit cost subsidies between rich and poor quintiles–
namely equal treatment and equal costs for the same
conditions, the variation is therefore attributed by utili-
zation and out of pocket payment.
The subsidy distribution across the economic gradient
is similar in both direction and degree to the utilization
distribution in our analysis. The pro-poor government
health subsidy is determined by pro-poor utilization
where uses concentrated among the poor UCS mem-
bers, see Figure 5.
Unsurprisingly, the poorest quintiles used more ser-
vices than the richest quintiles compared to the size of
beneficiaries in the poorest quintiles. The proportion of
all-facility OP visits by the poorest quintile (26-29%)
was higher than the corresponding population propor-
tion (23-24% of total UCS members from 2003 to 2009.
In contrast, the OP visits by the richest quintile (7-11%)
were disproportionately lower than the size of its popu-
lation, 12-13% of total UCS members.
Similarly, the poorest quintile UCS beneficiaries had a
higher proportion of hospital admissions (26-29%) than
the corresponding population size (23-24%) whereas the
number of hospital admissions for the richest quintile
Figure 2 Distribution of OP and IP government subsidies by wealth quintile as compared with the UCS beneficiary distribution, 2003-2009
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where the size of population was 12-13% was dispropor-
tionately lower (7-11%).
When OP visits and admissions were concentrated
among the poorest UCS beneficiaries more than their
richest counterparts, this pro-poor utilization drove the
pro-poor outcome of government health subsidies.
Health payment across rich-poor quintiles
During the UC period, certain UCS beneficiaries reported
having to pay out-of-pocket for their medical services. As
a result of the high frequency OP utilization, more UCS
members, 4% to 9%, though small, paid for OP services
than those for admission services, 1% to 4% when they
chose to bypass services to higher level of care without
properly referral; or paid for self-prescribed medicines in
private pharmacies or used private providers not covered
by the Scheme, Table 2. In public health facilities, 4-5%
of the UCS members paid for their OP visits during
2003-2006, in contrast to the 1-2% who did so during
2007-2009 period when the 30 Baht flat rate copayment
was abolished after the change of government.
The payment for IP admission in public hospitals
occurred for 3% of UC patients admitted during 2003-
2006 and reduced to less than 2% in 2007 and 2009
when copay was abolished. Health payment to private
facilities by the UCS members occurred mostly for OP
visits to private clinics but rarely for private hospital vis-
its and admissions, as they are more costly and unaf-
fordable in particular private sector IP services.
The difference in likelihood and average amount of
payment to public facilities across wealth quintiles of the
UCS beneficiaries for OP and IP services is illustrated in
Figures 6 and 7, respectively. The size of the balloon
reflects the size of the population in the five wealth quin-
tiles. A common pattern emerged for all years; Figure 6
and 7 illustrated 2004.
Figure 6 shows out of pocket payment for OP services,
where 33% of the poorest quintiles paid for OP services
but the amount was small, slightly more than 50 Baht
average per visit (less than US$ 2) while around 50% of
the richest quintiles paid for their OP services with a
much larger average amount, almost 400 Baht per visit
(approximately US$ 13).
Similarly, Figure 7 illustrates that a lower proportion
of the poorest compared to the richest quintiles were
Figure 3 Distribution of OP and IP subsidies by facility type for each wealth quintile, 2004
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paying for IP services with a much lower average
amount per admission of 600 Baht (approximately US$
20) compared to almost 5,000 Baht (approximately US$
167) respectively.
Discussion
This study provides clear and consistent evidence of
pro-poor government health budget subsidies for OP
and IP services between 2003 and 2009, which preferen-
tially benefited the poorer quintiles compared to the
relative size of their respective population. Three contri-
buting factors explain the pro-poor government health
subsidies.
First, the pro-poor utilization is the result of improved
access to heath services provided by district health sys-
tems for the poor, a majority of who reside in rural areas.
The district health system consists of a 30 to 90 bed dis-
trict hospital and an average of 10 health centres per
approximately 50,000 populations in the catchment area.
Health centres and district hospital form a contractor
provider network for UCS members through contractual
arrangement with the National Health Security Office.
This network provides a comprehensive set of OP and IP
services to UCS members. The fully functioning district
health system is a strategic hub of achieving pro-poor uti-
lization for OP and IP due to its geographical proximity,
so called “close-to-client services” where indirect cost of
travelling and access is low [9]. District health systems
are functioning due to adequate budget support, three
years mandatory rural health services by all new graduate
doctors since 1972, and later extended to cover nurses,
dentists, pharmacists and other paramedics [10]. Such
rural mandatory policies have resulted in a substantial
reduction in regional gaps in the density of human
resources over the last four decades [11]. Also the avail-
ability of private health providers for the rich reduces
competition from the rich for services provided by public
sector.
Second, the very low level of out-of-pocket payment is
the result of two factors; a comprehensive benefit pack-
age entitled to all UCS members including OP, IP which
covers all medicines with reference to the national drug
Figure 4 Government health subsidy for OP and IP services across wealth quintiles by geographic region, 2004. Note: Circle sizes are
proportional to number of UCS beneficiaries for each wealth quintile in the region
Limwattananon et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12(Suppl 1):S6
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/S1/S6
Page 7 of 11
list, high cost care such as chemotherapy, radiation ther-
apy, prevention and health promotion services. Although
there was a minimum level of flat rate copayment of 30
Baht (US$ 1) per visit or per admission; this was termi-
nated in 2006. The out-of- pocket payments are for ser-
vices either not covered by the benefit package such as
private clinics or bypassing the registered providers with-
out referral procedures. The minimum level of out-of-
pocket payment are in favour of the poor; this is reflected
by the probability and level of payment for both OP and
IP services is consistently low among the poorer than the
richer quintiles.
Our additional analysis found the 88-96% of UCS
members actually used UC services; the poorest quintile
had higher rate of using their entitlements, 70-80% for
OP visit and 90-95% for admission, while the among the
richest counterparts, 40-60% of them used OP entitle-
ment, 45-80% used IP entitlement [12].
Third, government financial commitment was signifi-
cant, not only the rhetoric in Parliament or at press
conferences. The 36.2% real term increase between 2003
and 2009 is significant. Evidence from National Health
Account shows the general government expenditure on
Figure 5 Distribution of OP visits and IP admissions by wealth quintile as compared with the UCS beneficiary distribution, 2003-2009
Table 2 Probability of any health payment by type of
health facility, %
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009
Any OP payment 7.2 8.9 8.4 7.2 5.2 4.4
Public facility 4.4 5.0 4.9 3.6 0.9 1.8
• Health center 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.2 0.3 0.8
• District hospital 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.6 0.3 0.5
• Provincial hospital 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.4
• University hospital 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
• Other govt. hospital 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Private facility 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.3 2.7
• Private hospital 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
• Private clinic 2.6 3.6 3.3 3.5 4.0 2.3
Any IP payment 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.8 2.2 1.1
Public facility 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.4 1.8 0.8
• District hospital 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 0.9 0.3
• Provincial hospital 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 0.8 0.4
• University hospital 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
• Other govt. hospital 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Private hospital 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3
Note: Sampling weights applied
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health increased from 50% to 67% of total health expen-
diture, and out of pocket payment reduced from 33% in
2001 to 18% of in 2008. The low level of out of pocket
payment is on par with the average of OECD countries.
Despite a favourable benefit package, share of total
health expenditure in GDP is minimum, increased from
3.3% of GDP in 2001 to 4.0% in 2008. The per capita
health spending was US$ 61 in 2001 and US$ 173 in
2008 [13].
It is interesting to see if the pro-poor public subsidy
and health utilization have been translated into an equi-
table achievement of health outcomes. National IP data-
set shows that the top-80% deadly diseases and the
conditions of which death is amenable to health care
revealed no increasing trends in both in-hospital and
30-day mortalities over the post-UCS period [14]. Our
additional analysis of the same HWS datasets found 19-
26% of the poorest quintiles of the UCS members
reported at least one illness episode during a prior
month, whereas 14-19% of the richest quintile did so;
reflecting higher health needs among the poor. Even
after controlling for a higher health need among the
poorer population, health services provided by district
health systems still disproportionately concentrated
among the poor [15].
The pro-poor government health spending is homoge-
neously distributed across four geographical regions; this
is a result of the homogeneity of district health systems
development nationwide. The rural mandatory services
are enforced to the whole country with financial incen-
tives such as hardship allowance, lump sum per diem,
non-private practice incentives and workload allowance
as well as other non-financial incentives such as housing
and social recognition. These interventions are effective
and recommended by WHO for rural retention [16].
Countries with high level of out of pocket payment
and no effective policies protecting the poor from health
payment have benefit incidence is in favour of the rich.
For example the poorer groups in Vietnam [17] get
much less than their population share of hospital-based
care and other public care but more than a proportion-
ate share of care provided at commune health centers.
Figure 6 Payers and payment amount for OP public facility by wealth quintile, 2004. Note: Q1 –poorest 20% of population, Q5 –richest 20% of
population. Circle sizes are proportional to number of the out-patients who were UCS beneficiaries for each quintile
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Pro-rich bias in the distribution of hospital-based care is
a common finding across several countries [18-21]. Gov-
ernment health spending in African countries was in
favour of the rich; for example, the poorest quintiles in
Ghana benefited 10%, 13% and 11% at primary facilities,
hospital outpatient and inpatient services respectively;
while the richest Ghanaian’s benefited 31%, 35% and
32% at these facilities. Also similar findings were
reported from Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar and Guinea
[22]. The Indonesian poorest quintiles benefited 7% and
5% from hospital outpatient and inpatient services while
the richest counterparts all benefited 41% from these
services.
Among eleven countries in Asia, with the exception of
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the poor
get much less than their population share of the public
health subsidy. The pro-poor benefit incidence in some
of these Asian countries are the results of limiting the
use of user fees, effective protection of the poor from
payment, and building a wide network of health facilities
[23] so that the poor can effectively use these services.
Conclusion
This paper clearly illustrates that a good design of UCS,
the public health insurance scheme, results in equity
outcome, in favour of the poor as measured by benefit
incidence analysis. Purchasing services at “close-to-cli-
ent” provider, in this case the primary healthcare net-
work at district level is a good practice, where rural
poor can actually use services when needed and with
better utilization rate. A comprehensive benefit package
and minimum or zero copayment results in low level of
out of pocket payment.
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